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Antitrust law, policy and practice are the product of a long and fruitful
interdisciplinary collaboration between law and economics. Our chapter addresses an
important aspect of that collaboration: the use courts can and should make of two bodies
of knowledge in empirical industrial organization economics, as that academic discipline
as evolved during the last few decades. Our examples focus on the U.S. experience,
which we know best. But we are confident that the broad considerations we discuss
apply to any competition policy regime.
The first body of economic knowledge we highlight involves methods of
distinguishing between alternative explanations for market outcomes or firm conduct.
This is termed the problem of “identification” in empirical economics. We show how
courts can apply what economists have learned about identification to the problems of
defining markets and determining whether market power has been exercised. We
emphasize that the same analytic issues arise regardless of whether the evidence on these
concepts is quantitative or qualitative.
The second relevant body of economic knowledge derives from the empirical
economic research literature, taken as a whole. That literature demonstrates that
differences among industries are important, making the industry the appropriate unit of
analysis for addressing economic issues related to competition policy. A similar
conclusion was reached long ago in antitrust law, when market definition became central
to reasonableness analysis. But, as we explain, the research literature goes further in a
way that has not yet been fully appreciated in antitrust: it suggests generalizations across
closely related industries that can be exploited to help evaluate evidence and resolve
cases.
We conclude by considering ways of increasing the institutional capacity of the
judicial system to make use of these two bodies of economic learning. These include a
possible limited role for neutral economic experts in litigation, and a role for the antitrust
enforcement agencies in identifying and codifying relevant generalizations about
industries from the empirical economic literature to make that learning available to
courts.
I.

Antitrust as an Interdisciplinary Collaboration

Antitrust law, more than most legal fields, looks like an outpost of economics.
Competition policy decision makers today rely extensively on economic concepts,

reasoning and evidence. Economic terms like elasticity of demand, marginal cost, and
oligopoly behavior have become part of the language of antitrust.
The importance of economics is most evident when antitrust cases are resolved in
litigation. In deciding individual cases, courts routinely undertake a detailed economic
inquiry into the nature of competition and the effect of challenged practices on that
competition. This is most evident in merger analysis, where modern examples are
numerous.[1] Economic concepts, reasoning and evidence are central to modern antitrust
analysis outside the merger context as well.[2] In enforcement agency investigations as
well as antitrust litigation, the development and interpretation of evidence about industry
market power and conditions of entry, and about the likely effects of a merger or business
practice, are importantly exercises in applied economics.
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Economic reasoning also plays an important role in framing legal rules. Perhaps
the most notable example occurred in 1977, when the Supreme Court overruled the per se
prohibition against non-price vertical restraints, causing such practices to be evaluated
under the rule of reason.[3] The Court emphasized that a blanket prohibition was
inappropriate given that manufacturers can use such contractual restrictions to promote
competition by inducing retailers to provide point–of-sale services like promotion and
after-sale service, through preventing dealer free-riding.
When industrial organization economists create new tools and methodological
approaches, moreover, the antitrust field pays attention. For example, as new empirical
methods of detecting and measuring market power have been developed, and as advances
in computerization have facilitated the collection and manipulation of data, empirical
economic tools have increasingly been applied to measure market power in antitrust
enforcement and litigation. Since our own experience using empirical methods in
antitrust began, during the mid-1980s,[4] and since we last surveyed the topic, in 1992,[5]
the use of such methods has grown rapidly. It is no longer a surprise to see empirical
analyses presented to the antitrust enforcement agencies by outside parties during the
course of an investigation, developed by enforcers to analyze a matter, or presented as
part of expert economic testimony in litigation.
Just as antitrust has become infused with economics, industrial organization
economics, the economics field most closely related to antitrust, has turned its attention
to the legal system. Over the past few decades, many of the issues and problems
addressed in the research literature on industrial organization economists have been
suggested or framed by antitrust cases. In one widely-used undergraduate industrial
organization text, for example, the index listing legal cases, most involving antitrust, goes
on for three pages.[6] Moreover, many academic economists in the industrial organization
field undertake litigation-related consulting projects involving antitrust issues.
Rather than viewing antitrust law as another victory for economic imperialism, or
industrial organization economics as captured by the concerns of well-heeled corporate
clients with antitrust problems, we understand these developments as the natural result of
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a long and successful interdisciplinary collaboration between law and economics in the
field of antitrust.
That deep engagement was likely inevitable. Most modern competition law regimes have
economic goals, such as promoting economic efficiency or consumer welfare, in whole or
substantial part.[7]
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An emphasis on economic goals inevitably brings economics to bear, leading
courts to frame antitrust issues in terms of economic concepts such as market power,
competitive effects, entry, and efficiencies, and to interpret the detailed facts involving a
particular industry and specific challenged practices through application of the logical
framework supplied by economics.[8] Courts have become analytically rigorous about the
effects of the challenged conduct on competition: identifying the market or markets in
which competition has or will likely be harmed and the mechanism by which the
challenged conduct does so. In U.S. antitrust law, the use of an economic framework was
abetted by the development of the “antitrust injury” doctrine, which requires plaintiffs in
many cases to explain how their injury flows from the antitrust violation they have
alleged.[9] This doctrine implements the key analytical distinction from economics
between protecting competition and merely protecting competitors, as it ensures that
plaintiffs may not recover damages merely because they have been harmed.
Antitrust analysis also reflects the concerns of the legal system, leading judges at
times to approach issues in ways that differ from how we economists might act on our
own. Courts may, for example, undertake the step of defining markets even in settings
where the competitive effects of business conduct can be measured directly, settings
where economists might find market definition unnecessary. Economists often prefer to
bring all the available information to bear, while courts at times adopt truncated analyses
that exclude certain relevant inquiries in order to reduce the costs of administering the
legal system and to specify clear and simple rules that give more guidance to courts and
firms. The legal system will not fine-tune particular industries to achieve specific
economic goals through regulatory determinations, as some economists have suggested.
Antitrust policy properly rejects frequent suggestions that courts or regulators attempt to
determine that a particular price be achieved, that a particular entrant come in, or that a
particular industry structure is efficient. Rather, to the extent possible, the legal system
trusts the competitive mechanism to achieve economic goals. For example, merger law
does not seek to identify and create the most efficient industry structure; it merely
attempts to determine whether a particular merger in an industry would harm
competition.

II.

The Empirical Problem of Identification
A.

Empirical Economic Methods in Antitrust

Economic methods are valuable to antitrust because they encourage precise
measurement and analysis of key economic relationships and effects.[10] In antitrust
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enforcement and litigation, the use of economic methods helps focus the attention of
decision-makers and litigants on the connection between the economic theory of the case
and the evidence. Economic methods help clarify what hypotheses are in dispute and
what evidence could help test them. Economic methods also encourage analytical
rigor.[11] Careful articulation of the theory can clarify thinking by laying bare key
assumptions and reasoning steps, and by structuring the collection of evidence.
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Our chapter addresses two facets of empirical economic methods of testing
theories with evidence that have particular relevance for antitrust analysis: decisionmaking when information is “local” and identification. First, economic methods bring to
the surface the background assumptions that underlie any particular articulation of the
link between economic evidence and the theory of the case. Antitrust policy-making,
whether conducted by enforcers or courts, invariably takes place under conditions of
uncertainty using what we term “local” information. Information is local for the obvious
reason that the record in any investigation or case is necessarily limited in scope.
Litigants have neither infinite time nor infinite resources to gather information.
Information is also local for a more subtle reason: because inferences about economic
concepts like market power or efficiencies, whether quantitative or qualitative, are never
made in a vacuum. Rather, those inferences are necessarily predicated on assumptions
that permit estimation of the magnitude of the effects.
Economic reasoning connecting theory and evidence lays bare those
assumptions, allowing them to be recognized. This in turn facilitates evaluation of the
plausibility of such assumptions and the extent to which conclusions depend on them.
Accordingly, empirical economists routinely test the robustness of their conclusions to
alternative assumptions, and identify the key assumptions underlying their analysis. This
reasoning process has obvious application to the evaluation of economic evidence in the
courtroom, and much of what goes on in the back and forth over empirical work between
expert economists can also be understood this way.
The need to make decisions when information is local has another implication for
investigations and litigation: it heightens the importance of using all available evidence,
whether quantitative or qualitative, in antitrust decision-making. For this reason, we give
qualitative and quantitative evidence equal attention below when we discuss
identification with respect to the market definition and market power inquiries.
Moreover, the need to make decisions when information is local heightens the value of
relying on generalizations based on studies of related industries when reaching
conclusions about industry performance and firm conduct, as we will also discuss further
below.
In the remainder of this section, we address a second important facet of empirical
economic methods with particular relevance when evidence is analyzed in
nonexperimental contexts such as antitrust: identification. We begin with a perspective
on quantitative data analysis, but the conclusions we reach also apply to the analysis of
qualitative evidence. Antitrust analysis, like most work in empirical social science, is
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best viewed generally as making inferences from evidence without the benefit of
performing experiments like those that are routine in high school chemistry.
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When data is analyzed in both experimental and nonexperimental contexts, the
analysis must address a number of difficulties, including specification (what are the range
of sensible general forms for the relationship under evaluation, including the relevant
variables, the way they could interact, and the nature of errors or uncertainty?),[12]
observation (how well do the measures approximate the variables they are intended to
represent?), and estimation (what do the data in the sample suggest as to the range of
plausible relationships among variables?). But inference in the social sciences, including
economics, must also confront a distinctive problem, difficulties in identification, that
were largely not issues in the experimental context of the physical sciences.[13] The
identification problem arises because empirical economists can rarely perform
experiments on economic actors; they must instead look carefully for settings in which
nature has created an experiment for them. In planning an empirical test, therefore,
economists must explain why it is reasonable to interpret the data as having been created
by an implicit experiment, and describe the nature of that experiment. This explanation –
identification – is an important part of empirical economic analysis.
More generally, identification can be understood as clarifying the basis on which
one theory can be preferred to another in nonexperimental evidence. This problem in
data analysis has obvious relevance for antitrust analysis, when a court must select
between alternative interpretations of industry behavior. All antitrust cases that go to trial
involve a contest between at least two distinct theories explaining firm conduct, one in
which the challenged behavior lessens competition and one in which it is efficient. The
economic principle of identification focuses attention on the correspondence between the
evidence and the competing economic theories, and thus on whether the evidence can be
used to distinguish between competing theories of the case.
We illustrate these points through a close analysis of identification strategies in
two areas of antitrust practice: defining markets and measuring market power. The first
area focuses on identifying demand-side attributes of the industry at issue; the second on
identifying supply-side attributes. Our chapter does not address the measurement of
damages, the problem of inferring agreement from circumstantial evidence or the many
other areas of antitrust practice where economic evidence is routinely employed.
B.

Identifying Buyer Substitution in Market Definition

The empirical problem of identifying the extent of buyer substitution is ubiquitous
in antitrust analysis. It is central not only to market definition, our primary example in
this section, but also to the identification of unilateral effects of merger among sellers of
differentiated products, an issue to which we will also refer. In both settings, a key
empirical question is whether demand grows less elastic when price increases are
coordinated across a more extensive scope of products or locations. This is the question
that determines whether the products and locations constitution an antitrust market or
whether a merger would create unilateral effects by lessening localized competition.
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Notwithstanding the close similarity of the economic questions addressed in these
two inquiries, the types of evidence commonly relied upon to answer differ substantially.
In practice, the unilateral effects inquiry gravitates toward quantitative evidence,[14] while
the market definition inquiry commonly looks first and often exclusively to qualitative
evidence. This difference – on its surface something of a paradox – may have a number
of explanations. First, market definition may tend toward qualitative evidence because it
was recognized as a central question in antitrust litigation long before quantitative
evidence became important, while the unilateral effects theory became persuasive only
with the development of empirical tools that allowed precise measurement of the extent
of localized competition and with the widespread availability of point-of-sale scanner
data for retail products (which are commonly differentiated, often by brand name).[15]
Second, unilateral effects analysis may gravitate toward quantitative evidence because it
can be difficult to delineate market boundaries convincingly in industries characterized
by extensive product differentiation. With market shares difficult to determine (and not
necessarily meaningful in any event),[16] quantitative methods generally provide more
convincing evidence of competitive problems than do market shares.[17] Third, market
definition may tend toward qualitative evidence because it is frequently (though
improperly) assessed in a vacuum, unmoored from the theory of harm to competition. By
contrast, the assessment of unilateral effects involves the direct evaluation of a
competitive effects theory, and this connection is readily made evident when quantitative
evidence is analyzed. There is no good reason in principle for ignoring quantitative
evidence in market definition or ignoring qualitative evidence in evaluating unilateral
effects; depending on industry circumstances and the nature of the available information,
either type of evidence could be the most compelling in any particular case. Accordingly,
our discussion will focus on the empirical economic issues at stake in identifying a
market, without regard to whether the evidence is qualitative or quantitative. But we will
often employ quantitative examples to illustrate methodological points, when that is how
the issues can be made most clear. Our discussion of market definition is limited to
settings in which the alleged harm to competition is prospective, and to those in which
the theory of why competition is harmed involves cooperative rather than exclusionary
conduct. Accordingly, we do not consider, among other things, the Cellophane fallacy.
It is obvious to economists that there is an implicit economic argument underlying
market definition, and that this argument is closely related to the economic and legal
theory of a particular case. In a horizontal effects merger case, for example, the relevant
question is whether competitive incentives of the merging firms will change following
their transaction. If there is a great deal of competition for the merging firms’ products
from other firms, competitive incentives will change little. Market definition offers one
way to get at this question, albeit an imperfect or incomplete one.[18] By contrast, courts
do not always see the market definition exercise as related to the economic theory of
harm. Instead they may think of market definition largely in a legally analytical way, as
one of the things which must be proved as part of the reasonableness analysis in an
antitrust case.
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Regardless of how market definition is understood, it is often a useful component
of the way antitrust doctrine is implemented in court. It requires the plaintiff in the
antitrust suit to state, with reasonable specificity, what competition might be harmed by
the challenged practices – by a merger, by allegedly exclusionary acts and practices, by
an agreement on practices said to facilitate coordination, etc. Indeed, market definition
may be useful in this procedural sense even when market shares are not strongly
probative of the magnitude of likely competitive harm. The market definition
requirement also permits the defendant to rebut the idea that competition is fragile
enough to be harmed, by attempting to establish a wider market.
The U.S. merger guidelines adopt a conceptual approach to market definition that
emphasizes an analysis of buyer substitution.[19] This approach is generally but not
invariably followed by U.S. courts.[20] Under this methodology, a candidate market does
not qualify as a relevant antitrust market unless the firms participating would find it
profitable to raise price for some or all of their products, at some or all of their locations,
after accounting for the likely buyer response to a higher price. This analysis turns on the
elasticity of candidate market demand. In particular, to first order, it would be profitable
for the firms participating in the candidate market to raise price if and only if the inverse
elasticity of the residual demand facing the firms[21] exceeds their Lerner Index of pricecost margin (1/, > L).[22] In the event this condition is not met, because candidate market
demand is too elastic, the candidate market is expanded to include demand substitutes
(additional products or additional locations). The candidate market expansion continues
until demand grows sufficiently less elastic as to satisfy the condition for a price increase
to be profitable.
The economic problem in evaluating unilateral competitive effects of mergers
among sellers of differentiated products is similar to that of market definition. In
differentiated products industries, competition may be localized: buyers may view some
products as closer substitutes to each other, and individual sellers may in consequence
compete more directly with those rivals selling the closest demand substitutes. A merger
of firms selling two products in localized competition may lead to higher prices for each
product, because the merged firm can now recoup some of the profit it would previously
have lost as a result of buyer substitution were it to raise price. Before the merger,
assuming single-product firms, each firms sets price such that the inverse elasticity of its
residual demand function equals its Lerner Index of price-cost margin. If the two
products are in localized competition, the residual demand for one or both grows less
elastic, giving the merged firm the incentive to raise one or both prices.
As should be evident, in order to define markets or assess unilateral effects, it is
essential to determine the extent of buyer substitution caused by a price increase. A
complete quantitative assessment would also require information about the price-cost
margin.[23] But the central economic issue at stake in market definition or unilateral
competitive effects is the likely magnitude of demand substitution.
In the remainder of this section, we examine strategies for identifying the
magnitude of buyer substitution in the event of a price increase. We look first at how
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demand substitution is identified, and separated from other causes of price increases,
when two common quantitative approaches are employed: estimation of demand
elasticities and inference about buyer substitution from the way prices vary as firm
conduct or market structure changes. We then show how the same and other approaches
to identification apply when evidence as to demand substitution is qualitative.
1.

Identification When Evidence is Quantitative

Estimating Demand Elasticities. To focus our discussion of how buyer
substitution is identified, we first sketch a hypothetical study seeking to provide evidence
as to whether the retail sale of beer in Chicago constitutes an antitrust market by
identifying the elasticity of beer demand in that city. The proposed study is purposely
oversimplified relative to how one might be set up in practice.
The study employs monthly data on total retail revenues and total retail quantities
of beer in the Chicago metropolitan area over a five year period. Average revenue is
computed from these data. Data on the average prices for soft drinks is also collected,
along with data on the average unemployment rate in the region. All variables are
transformed into their logarithms, and the following equation is estimated:
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ln quantity beer = " + $ ln price beer + ( ln price soft drinks
+ * ln unemployment rate + u.
The equation is estimated using two stage least squares, with a time series on the logged
average revenue from the retail sale of beer in Cleveland as an instrument for the price of
beer in Chicago. The resulting estimate of $ is interpreted as the elasticity of demand for
beer in Chicago.
A number of important issues related to the probative value of evidence aside
from identification are embedded even in this simple, straightforward econometric
approach to developing evidence on the magnitude of buyer substitution. We shall note a
few, but our list is not exhaustive. Some involve observation. Beers are differentiated
products, sold in a range of unit prices. In consequence, variation in average revenue, the
proxy for price, could reflect variation in the market share of various brands even if no
prices change. Assuming the resulting measurement error is not correlated with the other
independent variables in the equation, it would be expected to lead to a downward bias in
the estimate of $, toward finding little buyer substitution.[24] Also, the regional
unemployment rate might not be the best measure of the way changing local economic
conditions affect beer demand. For example, if beer consumption is concentrated within
particular demographic groups, the aggregate unemployment rate might not reflect the
financial situation of those buyers most interested in the product.
Other possible problems with this approach to learning about buyer substitution
involve specification. The estimated equation does not account for advertising, by
brewers or the producers of soft drinks, yet advertising may well affect demand. Nor
does it allow for substitution to other beverages such as wine. Possible seasonal variation
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in the demand for beer is unaccounted for.[25] And the double-log specification, while
convenient for interpreting coefficients (as elasticities), builds in an arbitrary assumption
about the curvature of demand and the form of the error term (multiplicative not additive)
that could be incorrect. These problems could lead to biased estimates of the key
parameter, the coefficient $. A more subtle specification problem involves the monthly
sample. A one month reduction in the average price of beer – for example, if multiple
producers place beer on sale at the same time – might lead to a different quantity
response from a more permanent price reduction. If a brief price cut would expand
purchases temporarily, as buyers stock up their refrigerators and pantries, the monthly
demand elasticity might overstate the intermediate or long term buyer response that
would likely be more relevant to questions that might arise in antitrust decisionmaking.[26]
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Estimation problems could also be important. In a monthly sample, unobservable
demand shocks might be serially correlated, making estimates of $ appear more precise
than the data actually allow. Or the prices of beer and soft drinks could be correlated,
making it difficult to disentangle the demand parameter associated with either price
individually.
In addition, this method of assessing the magnitude of likely buyer substitution
raises the distinctive social science difficulty of identification, our primary focus in this
chapter. The instrumental variable technique used to identify demand in the hypothetical
example operates in effect by removing variation in price where price changes are
unlikely to reflect buyer substitution (removing variation unlikely to cause movements
along a demand curve). In particular, the experiment created by the instrument used in
the hypothetical example presumes that when beer prices in Chicago move in the same
way as price changes in Cleveland, the price changes result from common production or
distribution cost variation (which induce movements along a demand curve) and not from
shifts in demand. If that assumption is correct, the output response to these price changes
will reveal the magnitude of buyer substitution. Unfortunately, this is a suspect
assumption in an advertising-intensive industry like brewing,[27] and if it is incorrect,
demand may appear more responsive to price (more elastic) than it is in fact.
This type of study of buyer substitution patterns is not exclusively employed in
market definition. Demand elasticities may also be estimated in order to make inferences
about the scope of localized competition and the potential for adverse unilateral effects of
mergers. Defendants may argue, for example, that unilateral effects are unlikely because
the cross-elasticity of demand between the products of the merger partners is low.[28]
More sophisticated approaches along similar lines estimate the parameters of demand
systems involving a large set of products, and simulate the effects of merger after
incorporating information (or assumptions) about marginal cost and the nature of
oligopoly conduct.[29]
Relating Price to Market Structure. The likely magnitude of demand substitution
in the event of a price rise is sometimes assessed quantitatively using a different type of
identifying experiment, involving changes in conduct or market structure. One example
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of such an experiment arises if there is a cartel which was in effect for only a given time
period or only in particular places. A related identifying experiment can be used if
market structure differs across otherwise similar locations, or changes over time. If
prices increase when the number of firms selling the products in a candidate market (or at
the locations in a candidate market, or in the times or locations of the cartel) decline, then
it may be reasonable to infer that a hypothetical monopolist of those products would find
it profitable to raise price at locations where the number of firms has not decreased.
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This approach was employed in the Staples litigation to analyze market definition
and the likelihood of unilateral competitive effects of merger.[30] The market definition
question in that case was whether consumable office supplies sold through office
superstores should be deemed a market, or whether to expand that candidate market to
include other distribution channels such as discount mass merchandisers and warehouse
club stores. Analysis of the data by the F.T.C.’s econometric witness showed that prices
were higher in locations and at times with only one superstore chain present than in
locations and at times with multiple superstore chains present. If so, a hypothetical
monopolist of consumable office supplies sold through office superstores in locations and
at times with multiple superstore chains present could profitably raise price, allowing the
inference of a market limited to the superstore distribution channel.[31]
This approach requires that the product be sold in multiple locations or at the
same location over time, and that nature performed an appropriate experiment, as by
creating differences in market structure from one period to the next, or one location to
another. Identification then results from the assumption, which must be defended, that
variation in market structure – particularly the decisions by office superstore chains on
where to locate – does not reflect variation in the marginal costs of doing business in
those locations (beyond factors that can be accounted for in the statistical analysis). That
is, in order to identify the influence of demand on prices, the appropriate econometric
practice is to use only those observable movements in market structure which correspond
to exogenous supply side changes, in this case, changes in competitive incentives. In the
analysis undertaken by the government in Staples, identification in comparisons of samecity prices over time was based on the assumption that any unobservable factors affecting
cost likely changed little from quarter to quarter over a few years. This assumption was
plausible on the facts of the case and was shared by both parties to the litigation.
Identification in comparisons across cities was based on the measurement of all
significant cost variables mentioned in merging firm documents as the basis for pricing
and location decisions. Moreover, the estimates of price changes based on cross-city
comparisons and same-city comparisons over time were similar, corroborating each
other’s identification strategy.
Other Quantitative Approaches. These two quantitative measures of buyer
responses to changes in relative prices – estimation of demand elasticities and the
comparison of prices across markets thought to be similar except for differences in
market structure – do not exhaust the possible methodological approaches. Other
quantitative possibilities suggested in the economics literature are potentially available
for antitrust analysis. For example, beginning with the influential work of Berry,
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Levinsohn and Pakes, a number of articles model the structure of product differentiation
to attempt to measure long run substitution behavior by buyers.[32] Other studies use
information about price dispersion to study price discrimination.[33] Perhaps the largest
literature concerns the strategic determination of prices in auctions.[34]
2.

Identification When Evidence is Qualitative
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Market definition is more often conducted without these types of systematic
empirical analyses than with them.3[35] This should be no surprise: good data is not
always available, key parameters in the estimation can be difficult to pin down
(accompanied by large standard errors), and some tribunals are less comfortable than
others with the problem of sorting out conflicting econometric testimony. Moreover
qualitative evidence can be compelling, at times more probative than quantitative
evidence. But when qualitative evidence is employed, the underlying economic logic of
the identification strategy is often analogous to an approach to identification taken in the
empirical economics literature with respect to quantitative evidence.
Demand Response to Price. A qualitative analogue to the estimation of
demand elasticities may come from anecdotal evidence involving buyer responses. A
firm’s marketing executives may be able to report on the results of an experiment with a
price increase,[36] or that their price increased following what they perceived as firmspecific increase in marginal cost. The executives may have an understanding of whether
they lost share following a price increase, and if so, which rivals benefited the most from
buyer substitution. To identify these responses as providing information about buyer
substitution, there must be good reason to believe that the price or cost changes were
exogenous.
Relating Price to Market Structure. A comparison of prices across markets
thought to be similar except for differences in market structure similarly does not
invariably require sophisticated data analysis. The court opinion in Staples, for example,
evaluates this evidence based solely on party pricing documents, without reference to the
econometric evidence in the record analyzing pricing systematically. The court found,
based on the documentary evidence, that office superstore prices were higher when fewer
superstore chains were competing. This conclusion was based both upon comparisons
across markets that varied in the number of competing superstore chains at a given time,
and on comparisons within markets in which the number of superstore varied over time.
The latter price comparisons, made based on the anecdotes and raw data presented in the
documentary evidence, identified the influence of demand on prices (or, in this case, the
lack of influence of demand on prices) under the same assumption adopted in the
econometric work that any unobservable factors affecting cost likely changed little over
the time period studied.
Structure of Product Differentiation. Market definition might also be based on
qualitative information about the distribution of product characteristics and seller
locations, and information on how much more buyers value products that are exactly
what the buyer wants relative to products that are not quite what buyers are looking for.
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This approach would be analogous to econometric methods of inferring the distribution
of the valuations buyers place on unobservable product characteristics from market
shares and buyer characteristics.[37] This methodology requires that buyers differ from
each other in their valuations of product characteristics, and that those differences or the
basis for them be observable.
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Under some circumstances, this kind of analysis can be conducted without
sophisticated modeling. For example, seller marketing documents may describe the
geographic location of seller plants, the geographic distribution of buyers, and shipping
costs. That information could be used to identify those buyers that view any pair of firms
as their first and second choices, and to assess the likely profitability of a unilateral
increase in price at either location following their merger. The econometric literature
emphasizes the inferential problems arising from the presence of characteristics known to
buyer and seller but unobservable to the analyst, as those characteristics are likely
correlated with price. Accordingly, to identify the results of this kind of qualitative
calculation as depicting buyer substitution patterns, it is important to have confidence that
the most important product and buyer characteristics – locations in the above example –
are observable.
Buyer Surveys and Bidding Records. Another method of assessing the likely
response of buyers to price changes, buyer surveys, has both quantitative and qualitative
analogues. One quantitative possibility might involve sampling of retail customers at
shopping malls using a carefully-constructed survey instrument, for example.[38] But
surveys can also be informal, based on customer interviews. The latter approach was
adopted by the Irish Competition Authority as the basis for market definition and
unilateral effects analysis in a recent decision preventing IBM from acquiring another
firm in the business recovery hotsite industry.[39] If there is some basis for concluding
that the customer views are informed, representative and account for a reasonable
fraction of the relevant business, even an informal survey may provide a reliable guide to
likely buyer substitution patterns. The identification problem in these survey contexts,
whether the evidence is quantitative or qualitative, would be addressed with an argument
as to why the reported buyer responses are reliable guides to future buyer conduct under
the conditions likely then to prevail in the marketplace.
A different approach to a buyer survey of demand, of particular applicability to
the analysis of unilateral competitive effects of merger, involves the examination of
bidding records to identify buyer preferences and substitution possibilities. If many
buyers routinely solicited bids from the same two sellers in the past, that evidence may
identify localized competition between the two today, at least if product characteristics
and relative prices among all sellers (including those two firms) have not changed (the
identification assumption). That a particular buyer who bought from firm A in the past
included firm B in a final round of bidding indicates that firm B may be its second choice
– more reliably, in some circumstances, than if the buyer were simply to opine about its
second choice. As with other methods of assessing buyer substitution, the identification
issue is similar regardless of whether the evidence is quantitative, derived from a
systematic analysis of buyer bidding records (or by comparing the records of the sellers),
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or qualitative, developed from an informal survey of an informed and representative
group of customers.
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3.
Business Executive Views and Identification
Even when the evidence is primarily quantitative, the argument for identification
may turn on qualitative evidence, particularly the views of business executives.[40]
Experienced marketing executives may be able to explain which price changes likely
result primarily from shifts in supply, whether all the significant cost-shift variables are
observable, whether buyer valuations of product characteristics are observable and
unchanging, and the like. For example, while we were working for one of the parties in a
merger investigation over two decades ago, we sought econometrically to estimate the
degree to which the potential exercise of market power for products of the parties had
been disciplined by substitution to third-party products. We used a product-specific price
and quantity data set. But we also asked managers to explain the changes in prices in the
data set. We sought to use only the exogenous changes in prices which managers chose
to implement for supply-side reasons, excluding their reactions to shifting demand
conditions and to the exogenous movements of other firms.[41]
As a general rule it is sensible to suppose that business executives have a
reasonable basis for their opinions. But in principle, the reliability of those views could
be tested and buttressed by asking the same kind of questions that would naturally arise
were such conclusions reached by an expert economist based on an empirical study.
Suppose, for example, that likely buyer substitution in the event of a price rise – a key
issue in market definition and the evaluation of the unilateral effects of merger among
sellers of differentiated products – is assessed not through a quantitative study of demand
but through the testimony of an industry marketing executive. Like the econometrician
thinking about market definition, the marketing executive concerned with pricing needs
to how customers would react to a price change undertaken by the company in an effort
to increase profit margins. Would customers substitute away, and if so, to which
competitors’ products? Would that substitution be much lessened if a particular
competitor were (coincidentally or through conscious parallelism or otherwise) to raise
prices at the same time? Marketing executives very frequently think about the first two
questions, perhaps less frequently about the third, and draw on a wide variety of different
sources of knowledge. In assessing the marketing executive’s testimony and documents,
the key questions of identification turn on the executive’s familiarity with this and related
markets, the depth of investigation undertaken by the executive, the plausibility of the
background assumptions the executive relies upon, and the clarity with which evidence
was linked to the business purpose of assessing a pricing decision.
If an executive were testifying about the output effects of past increases in price,
one important question would be whether his or her views are based on observations as to
past supply-side shocks.[42] If past price changes were instead largely the result of shifts
in demand, one might question whether the executive would have much basis for
developing an informed opinion as to buyer substitution from observing buyer responses
to price fluctuations.[43] Ultimately, the linkage of the analysis of buyer responses to
price changes that come from the supply side – cost or strategy changes at the firm or at
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its competitors – determines its suitability for the pricing business purpose and its
suitability as evidence in an antitrust enquiry.
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To see how such a conversation about identification might play out in practice
with evidence in a merger case where unilateral effects are alleged, suppose that the
government or other plaintiff can show that a number of customers report that products of
merging firms are their first and second choices, the two firms’ products have common
characteristics valued by customers that distinguish them from the products of most
rivals, and the two firms monitor and respond to each other’s business decisions more
closely than they respond to the decisions of other rivals. This qualitative and anecdotal
evidence should be sufficient to draw an inference that the demand curve for one or both
products will grow less elastic with merger, creating a unilateral incentive to raise price.
The merging firms could respond by undermining the probative value of the
government’s evidence, showing that the government’s evidence misleads, by raising the
same kind of problems that might undermine identification were the government’s
evidence quantitative. The merging firms might show, for example, that the customers
are not informed and representative and that unobservable product characteristics are also
important in determining buyer substitution patterns in the industry.[44] In this
hypothetical litigation context, either side might supplement its position with quantitative
evidence, for example as to the magnitude of the demand cross-elasticities between the
two products. But identification is no more and no less important when the evidence is
anecdotal and qualitative as when the evidence is systematic and statistical.
The procedural context of antitrust lawsuits typically does not permit the
multiyear data-building process sometimes needed for cutting edge academic industry
studies; it must deal with the available information. Nor does it permit the scholarly
tactic of selecting for study industries where data are available or where a particularly
attractive identification strategy presents itself. An antitrust investigation or lawsuit is
about a particular industry, all evidentiary inferences are made conditional on background
assumptions (knowledge is local), and even if the appropriate statistical technique from
the academic literature is clear, the data may not be available to employ that technique
within the time and resource constraints of litigation. In short, courts must decide
antitrust cases reasonably expeditiously, for good public policy reasons, which sometimes
constrains the amount of information and especially data available for analysis. This
makes the use of multiple sources of evidence particularly valuable.
C.

Identifying and Measuring Market Power

Market power – the ability of firms to raise price above the competitive level for a
sustained period – is a part of the legal framework in multiple antitrust contexts.
Monopoly power is an element of the monopolization offense under Sherman Act §2.[45]
In addition, market power is often frequently assessed under Sherman Act §1, to
determine whether conduct undertaken pursuant to an agreement was reasonable. The
market power inquiry may apply to a firm individually or to a number of firms as a
group. Historically, in the antitrust world, market power has most commonly been
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identified through inference from a high market share. But direct evidence has
increasingly become important as an alternative, in part because academic economists
have developed a number of econometric approaches for measuring market power.[46]
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It is worth emphasizing that the ultimate economic question in antitrust litigation
is almost never whether a firm or set of firms have market power. The case almost
invariably concerns an economic objection to the challenged conduct – an agreement
among rivals, a merger, exclusionary tactics and the like – that turns on whether the
conduct has increased (in a retrospective case) or is likely to increase (in a prospective
case) market power. Accordingly, the economic question is not the level of market
power but the change. Antitrust law at times relies upon presumptions that if the level of
market power is high, various types of conduct will increase it, and if the level of market
power is low, they will not. That is, in legal terms, anticompetitive effect is at times
inferred from proof of market power.[47] Whether or not such inferences are justified
empirically, they shift attention from the ultimate economic question of whether market
power has increased. Our discussion of identification when measuring market power also
focuses on levels for expositional clarity. Nonetheless, it is important not to lose sight of
the ultimate question. Accordingly, when it is possible, economic methods should be
used to assess changes in market power, examining a historical counterfactual without the
challenged practices in a retrospective case or providing an analysis of the change in
incentives in a prospective one.
As with identifying buyer substitution, quantitative methods of measuring market
power through direct evidence have parallels involving the use of qualitative evidence.
In this section, we discuss a number of approaches to identifying market, and highlight
characteristic econometric issues that arise with each approach, regardless of whether the
available evidence is quantitative or qualitative. We emphasize the method of
identification.
1.

A Formal Framework for Market Power Measurement

Many methods of measuring market power can be understood as growing out of a
two-equation model with an industry demand function and industry quasi-supply
function:
(1)

P = f(Q,Y,u)

(2)

P = C(Q,W,v) + h(f(•),C(•),Z).

Equation (1) is an inverse demand function, relating industry price P to industry
output Q, a vector of observable demand-shift variables Y, and stochastic error u. In the
case of a homogeneous product industry, both P and Q are scalars. If the industry is
differentiated, they have as many elements as there are products in the industry.[48]
Equation (2) is a quasi-supply function. It describes price as equal to industry
marginal cost C, which is viewed as a function of a vector of cost-shift variables W and a
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stochastic error v, plus a markup, the function h(•). The markup function in equation (2)
depends on marginal cost, demand, and exogenous variables Z. The models adopted in
the literature typically allow perfect competition (price-taking) as a special case, by
permitting the markup function to equal zero. If the markup is positive, price exceeds the
competitive level. In both equations (1) and (2) we have suppressed the unknown
parameters that will be estimated.
Both equations in this two equation system can provide information relevant to
making inferences about market power. Incentives for exercising market power are
related to the slope or elasticity of the demand function, equation (1). The extent to
which a firm or firms have taken advantage of those incentives is related to the markup
function in equation (2). The nature of the oligopoly interaction (e.g. static Bertrand or
Cournot, or some form of coordination) is also related to the markup function, and also
bears on the extent to which firms have exercised market power.
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We have previously discussed issues involving the identification of demand, in
connection with market definition, though will return to them briefly in this section. We
will also discuss strategies for identifying parameters related to market power in equation
(2). Before doing so, we will describe some general strategies for inferring market power
related to this two-equation setup.
Estimating Quasi-Supply. The empirical economic literature employs several
approaches to estimating the quasi-supply function, equation (2).[49] Some studies
specify (2) as derived from a particular game-theoretic model of market power. For
example, when the investigation involves unilateral market power, Bertrand (pricesetting) competition is the most common assumption. The Bertrand assumption leads to
prices in excess of marginal cost only if products are differentiated or if firms have
increasing marginal cost functions.[50] The antitrust purpose of estimating (2) is to
discriminate between higher costs and a higher markup as the source of higher prices.
The markup function h(•) can take a variety of forms, depending on various
aspects of industry structure and the range of plausible ways in which firms might
interact. The simplest models are competition (h (•)=0) and monopoly (P-h(•)=MR.) For
some game-theoretic models, the markup function depends only on demand and cost
elasticities. Other theories are more complex, potentially leading h(•) to depend on
complex unobservables such as firms’ information. A number of theories suggest that
firm conduct will vary with market conditions. Accordingly, some approaches allow the
markup to vary with observables (variables in the vector Z), which might include, for
example, measures of market concentration (like the HHI) or negative demand shocks
(negative realizations of u), as suggested by various theories of oligopoly. But when
quasi-supply during any particular time period arises as the single period realization of a
repeated game, the markup function may depend in a complex way on time preferences,
information, and other variables; under such circumstances, researchers tend to
approximate that dependence in a simple way.
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One useful generalization has structured much of the empirical literature on
estimating quasi-supply: game-theoretic models of supply commonly indicate that there
is more market power with less elastic industry demand. This generalization leads many
empirical economists to include the term -Qfr(•) in the markup function, to capture the
pricing incentive that lies in the difference between price and marginal revenue.[51]
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Estimating Demand. Variation in the slope of the demand curve, equation (1),
and the resulting incentive for market power, can be assessed at the individual firm level
as well as at the market level. The distinction is particularly important in product
differentiated industries. One approach is to estimate a multiple-price, multiple quantity
version of equation (1). This approach is well suited for data-rich environments in which
the identification problem at issue in measuring buyer substitution can readily be solved.
Another approach is to estimate the slope of the residual demand curve facing a
particular firm or a small number of firms.[52] A residual demand function can be defined
for a firm or a candidate market. It is derived from the structural demand function by
substituting best response functions for the output of rivals, thus projecting rival output
on demand and cost-shift variables. Its elasticity reflects the response of a firm to cost
variation after accounting for two economic forces: buyer substitution (the parameters of
demand) and rival reactions (incorporated through the determinants of rival best
responses). If a firm’s (or group of firms) residual demand function is perfectly elastic, it
does not exercise market power. It cannot raise price on its own; the combination of
buyer substitution and output expansion of rivals would make any such effort ineffective.
But a downward sloping residual demand function indicates that the firm (or group) has
the ability to raise price by reducing output, and thus can exercise market power.
In econometric terms, the elasticity of a firm’s residual demand is identified by a
movement in an exogenous variable affecting the supply of firm and no other. The
intuition is that a higher marginal cost for the firm of interest (and that firm alone) gives
the firm an incentive to raise price, but price will not rise in fact unless the firm also has
the ability to increase price after accounting for the expected response of buyers and all
rivals (none of which experienced a similar cost increase, so none of which have an
incentive to raise price on their own).
The empirical literature has made progress in two very different areas in
estimating residual demand functions. One is in product differentiated industries. Here
the largest advantage of the residual demand curve approach is that it economizes on
identifying variation. When the source of single-firm market power is differentiation, in
other words, there is little distinction between what is learned about market power from
estimating the residual demand curve and what is learned from estimating structural
demand curves.
The empirical literature has also made progress on the case in which a single
firm’s residual demand curve is sloped because the supply curves of other firms rise
steeply. This approach has been deployed in studies of wholesale electricity markets, for
example. In those markets, observable measures of the height and slope of other firms’
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supply curve are available. For example, the capacity of other firms’ plants, the capacity
of their most efficient plants, and so on, are in some data sets. A firm competing against
only capacity-constrained rivals will face the industry demand elasticity and thus
generally have more market power than a firm whose competitors might expand if price
were to rise. The literature has taken advantage of that feature in estimating residual
demand curves. Empirical economists have also estimated residual demand curves in the
intermediate case of a firm facing only competitors whose more efficient plants are at
capacity.[53]
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Direct Measurement of Accounting Margins. Another approach to measuring
market power is an alternative to statistical estimation: to attempt to measure directly the
departure of price from an accounting estimate of marginal cost. The common measure
is the Lerner Index, defined as L = (P-C)/P. L is related to the markup function h(•)
discussed above. In the special case of perfect competition, both h(•) and L are zero. Let
the elasticity of industry demand be denoted , in absolute value. In homogeneous good
industries, the magnitude of market power is often taken to equal the product L,. This
expression calibrates the Lerner Index by recognizing that a high value for L is unlikely if
industry demand is relatively elastic, and that a low value of L does not reflect much
success in raising price toward the monopoly level if industry demand is relatively
inelastic.
Cost-based measures of market power such as the Lerner Index will be more
meaningful when market power arises mainly from product differentiation (in which case
the nature of oligopoly conduct is relatively unimportant in explaining markup); from
static non-cooperative behavior (such as Cournot (quantity-setting) behavior) when the
demand function is steep; or when the industry is behaving close to perfect competition
or monopoly. They will be least meaningful when conduct is coordinated in ways that
lead markups to vary over time (unless changes in Lε can be correlated with the
economic determinants of successful coordination). [54]
Inference About Oligopoly Conduct. With an estimate of both L and ,, it may
be possible to make inferences about the nature of firm behavior of relevance to antitrust
analysis. For example, it may be possible to test the hypothesis that firm supply is close
to the monopoly level, close to perfect competition, close to Bertrand supply, and so
on.[55] For this purpose, the estimate of the Lerner index can either come from cost data
or, more typically in the literature, can come from an estimate of firms’ supply behavior.
For an industry which might be collusive, the literature has tested the hypothesis that
behavior is closer to the monopoly level in some time periods but not in others
(Bresnahan (1987), Porter (1983)) because that is the implication of oligopoly supergame
theory.
This method of inference depends on a wide range of assumptions. First, it
incorporates an estimate of the demand elasticity, and thus depends in part on the
probative value of the evidence as to buyer substitution from which that elasticity
estimate derives. Second, any implementation must address a number of practical
problems.[56] Third, the Lerner Index can be difficult to measure because of well known
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problems in the measurement of marginal cost. These include conceptual difficulties in
relating accounting measures to economic concepts. For example, accountants define
cost categories for audit purposes that do not necessarily track economist’s concepts; the
accounting treatment of depreciation presents particular difficulties; accounting data may
not capture opportunity costs; and average variable costs do not equal marginal cost if the
marginal cost curve is not horizontal.[57] Indeed, the academic literature in empirical
industrial organization economics commonly treats the level of marginal cost as
unobservable even when some of its determinants, like input prices and scale, can be
observed.[58]
B.

Identification Issues
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We focus our discussion of identification of market power on the problem of
determining the nature of firm conduct when marginal cost is not observable. When
relying on quantitative evidence, this is the problem of identifying the markup function in
equation (2). We emphasize the possibility that marginal cost is not observable because
that is the dominant perspective in the empirical economics literature. As with our
discussion of identifying the magnitude of buyer substitution, we treat quantitative and
qualitative evidence analogously.
Rotations in Demand. To identify firm conduct in equation (2) when marginal
cost is unobservable, empirical economists often identify oligopoly conduct from the
response of price to rotations in demand (or changes in demand elasticity produced by
that rotation).[59] If price rises as demand grows less elastic, industry conduct is not
competitive. Less elastic demand creates room for firms to exercise market power, if
they possess it.
This insight is perhaps most familiar as a method of inferring market power from
anecdotal evidence, when price discrimination (as defined by economists) is viewed as
evidence of market power.[60] Qualitative information could also be used to make this
inference: if firm marketing executives routinely refer to value-of-service pricing rather
than cost- or competitor-based pricing, they may well be taking advantage of less elastic
buyer demand to raise price.
The econometric literature on implementing this approach to measuring market
power emphasizes the importance of distinguishing price increases arising when firms
take advantage of less elastic demand – which reflect market power – from price
increases that result from increases in cost.[61] This identification problem also arises
when the evidence is qualitative. Price increases for certain customers, at certain times,
or in certain markets could come about because firms hit capacity constraints or input
costs are high, even if higher costs happen to be correlated with less elastic demand. This
possibility must be accounted for in order to infer market power from price increases in
markets in which demand grows less elastic.
Variation in Observable Cost Components. Even when firm or industry marginal
cost is difficult to observe, some of its major determinants, such as key input prices, may
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be observable. Under such circumstances, movements in price that remain after
accounting for variation in factors likely affecting cost may be used to make inferences
about market power. This approach identifies market power from observing price rises
not likely explained by cost increases.
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This type of reasoning has been adopted in antitrust cases, using anecdotal
evidence. One example comes from American Tobacco,[62] a mid-20th century case in
which the Supreme Court upheld a jury finding that the leading tobacco firms had
conspired to monopolize by fixing cigarette prices and excluded competition. The
conclusion relied in part on evidence that cigarette prices rose during the Great
Depression, a time when the costs of tobacco leaf were unusually low and manufacturing
costs were declining. Tobacco leaf and cigarette manufacturing costs were implicitly
treated as observable factors affecting cigarette costs but not affecting the costs of
producing demand substitutes.
The early antitrust decision in Addyston Pipe[63] illustrates the inference of market
power through a similar comparison made across markets rather than over time. The six
defendants in the case manufactured cast iron pipe, which they sold to local gas and water
utilities in procurement auctions. The firms divided markets: they agreed on which firm
would enter the lowest bid in procurements in certain “reserved” cities. But cities more
than 500 miles from the firms’ foundries (“free” cities) were not allocated to any
individual seller. Prices were higher in the reserved cities than the free cities, even
though costs were lower in the reserved cities, allowing the inference that the firms had
exercised market power. The econometric evidence presented by the F.T.C. in Staples,
discussed above, provides an example of how systematic empirical evidence can be used
to make a similar comparison.
When making the kind of comparisons undertaken in American Tobacco or
Addyston, whether doing so with anecdotal evidence as in those cases or through a
systematic empirical study as in Staples, they identification problem of ruling out cost
increases as the explanation for price increases is sometimes framed as an omitted
variable issue or a measurement error problem. In Addyston, for example, what if certain
important costs were greater in the reserved cities but not observed by the court? This
possibility is not entirely far-fetched. According to the court, defendants claimed that
prices in at least one reserved city were higher because specifications were detailed and
precise, requiring custom production rather than use of stock on hand. Hence, it is
possible that custom production was on average more likely to be required in reserved
than free cities. Or suppose that reserved cities tended to have a different geology than
free cities, requiring pipe manufacturers to employ more costly manufacturing
techniques. This could also mean that input costs were greater in reserved cities for a
reason not observed by the court. In the tobacco example, the cost of a key input was
declining, and manufacturing costs were falling, but what if distribution costs were
instead increasing? Not surprisingly, measurement error and omitted variable issues like
these were central to the econometric argument between the parties in Staples.[64]
Comparison With the Conduct of Competitive Firms. Another way to interpret
the methods of identifying market power employed in American Tobacco and Addyston
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Pipe is to view what the courts did as comparing the way firms behaved with the way
competitive firms would likely behave. If there is a difference, the firms likely exercised
market power. The essence of the identification problem does not change with this
change in perspective, as a perfectly competitive industry would raise price only if
marginal costs increased.
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This alternative interpretation is worth highlighting because it has been
employed in the empirical economic literature. For example, a similar approach has long
been a staple of cartel detection using qualitative methods. According to one story, the
infamous electrical equipment cartel involving General Electric and Westinghouse,
uncovered around 1960, was discovered by a journalist who noticed that the unsuccessful
bidders in one procurement had submitted bids that were identical to the last digit.[65]
This pricing pattern was consistent with a bid-rigging scheme – the firms had presumably
chosen their bids to avoid undercutting the colluding firm that had been selected to win
that particular procurement – and hard to rationalize with competition.
A comparable strategy for identifying market power has been adopted in the
empirical economics literature to detect price-fixing in auction markets. Those studies
look at the way firms form bids in markets or at times thought to be competitive – at the
factors that affect bidding strategies – and compare the results with the way bids are
formed in markets where market power might be exercised.[66] The competitive
benchmark might be identified empirically, through analysis of the bidding strategies
actually adopted by firms thought to behave in a competitive manner. Firms that respond
to factors like variation in costs or the determinants of buyer willingness to pay
differently in the test markets than in the control markets would be identified as likely
exercising market power. For example, Porter and Zona (1999) used this method to
identify a partial bid rigging conspiracy among sellers of school milk in Ohio. They
found that members of the bid-rigging cartel behaved differently, along several
dimensions of behavior, when the nearest competitors to any particular school district
were other members of the cartel than when there was a nearby nonparticipant.
Alternatively, the competitive benchmark might be identified based on a theoretical
model of how competitive firms would act. For example, firms that do not raise their bids
when their costs go up, or firms that systematically raise their bids when a rival lowers its
bid, might be thought not to be acting the way a competitor would. Either way, this
strategy for identifying market power requires a great deal of confidence in the
competitive benchmark, and confidence that cost differences across bidders (that might
affect how aggressively they would bid) are accounted for.
Another antitrust application of the idea that price formation inconsistent with
competition can be used to identify market power comes in the analysis of the
coordinated effects of merger. In a market in which coordination is imperfect and
incomplete – as coordinated oligopoly conduct would be expected to be, given
difficulties firms subject to the antitrust laws have in communicating and making side
payments – one firm, termed the maverick, may constrain the effectiveness of
coordinated pricing when its rivals would be willing to coordinate more completely (as
by raising the industry price closer to the monopoly level). Coordinated effects analysis
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is often concerned with identifying the maverick and analyzing the effects of the merger
on its incentives to prevent more effective coordination.[67] To infer a maverick’s identity
its marketplace behavior, that behavior must be compared with a competitive benchmark,
much as is done in the auction literature on identifying bid-rigging. For example, if
industry prices change in response to pricing decisions by one firm but not those of its
rivals (or to the determinants of such decisions, such as firm-specific costs facing one
firm but not those of its rivals), the firm that appears to be constraining industry pricing is
a likely maverick.[68]
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Unusual Movements in Price. Another way to identify market power when cost
is unobservable to isolate changes in price that cannot be explained by observable factors
influencing cost and demand, and that are so large or unusual in their distribution as to
have no plausible interpretation other than variation in quasi-supply (equation (2))
resulting from changes in conduct. Again identification of market power in essence turns
on ruling out alternative, cost-based explanations for the price changes.
This strategy was adopted by Porter (1983) to identify coordinated conduct
among 19th century railroads. Porter found occasional short-term declines in price that
could not be explained as the result of declines in demand in a competitive market, and
could not be explained by reductions in the observable determinants of cost. Rather, he
concluded, they were consistent with a model in which firms occasionally engage in price
wars, set off by unexpected declines in market demand, in order to deter cheating that
would undermine cooperative pricing during other periods. He identified these periods
econometrically by showing that multiple pricing regimes (one during high price periods
and one during price wars) fit the unexplained variation in price (the error) better than did
a single price regime.[69] Any single large price decline could reflect random chance, but
multiple declines otherwise unexplained could reasonably be attributed to shifts in seller
conduct.[70]
One could imagine exploiting the same ideas about the properties of unexplained
price changes to identify market power in a industry experiencing occasional price wars,
with qualitative instead of quantitative evidence. If industry participants routinely
respond to low prices not by pointing to lower costs but instead by complaining about
pricing breakdowns and calling for improved pricing discipline, and if such comments in
the trade press are commonly followed by increasing prices shortly thereafter, that
evidence could suggest that the participants see themselves as engaged in coordinated
pricing punctuated by occasional price wars.
III.

The Nature and Significance of Industry Differences

A large empirical literature in industrial organization economics has
systematically studied market power, entry barriers, collusion, and other topics relevant
to antitrust. In the previous section, we reviewed a number of the methodologies
empirical economists have employed for studying buyer substitution and market power.
Most of this work does not have antitrust policy formation as its primary goal.[71] Almost
all of this work studies a single industry or a group of closely related industries, such as
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inherently local businesses observed in a number of different cities or counties. This
literature offers a great deal of support to the basic antitrust paradigm of applying a
general economic framework to analyze a particular industry in which harm to
competition is alleged. The empirical economic literature itself uses the same paradigm
by employing different subsets of the same broad, general body of economic and
econometric tools to analyze particular industries. In this section, we review what has
been learned about the nature and significance of industry differences. We describe the
failure of the research effort to identify broad empirical generalizations across all
industries. We also describe the successful and ongoing (if less well known in antitrust
circles) effort to identify generalizations across closely related industries that can be
exploited in antitrust to help evaluate evidence and resolve cases.
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One important finding of the economics literature is of substantial variation across
industries in features most relevant to antitrust. Studies of market power find more of it
in some industries than others, and some studies find more market power for some
products in the same product differentiated markets than for others.[72] Studies of entry
similarly find that the conditions of entry vary across industries.[73] At the broadest level,
therefore, the empirical economic literature demonstrates that there are important
industry differences in the economic concepts that matter most to antitrust analysis. This
confirms the importance of an industry-specific fact-based antitrust enquiry into such
matters as market definition, market power, and entry barriers.
A.

Unsuccessful Efforts to Generalize Broadly Across Industries

From both an academic and a policy perspective, an obvious question arises. Can
economists reach a more detailed and specific answer than “it varies across industries?”
Could economists, instead, systematically predict which industries are more likely to
depart from competition? From an academic perspective, this would involve learning the
underlying causes of why certain industries have more market power (or higher entry
barriers, etc.) than others. From an antitrust policy perspective, this would support the
more rapid identification of industries in which a detailed enquiry was likely to find
market power (or entry barriers, etc.) It could also lead to the development of useful
policy rules of thumb, “safe harbors,” presumptions, and other abbreviated enquiries.
A large-scale, sustained effort in industrial organization economics, which
flourished until the early 1970s, once attempted to provide a detailed and specific set of
answers to these important questions. That effort was called the “structure-conduct
performance” (SCP) approach. It sought to establish a set of presumptions to identify
which markets have market power and entry barriers, by looking for simple, easily
observed indicia. One extensively-explored hypothesis was that capital-intensive, R&D
intensive, or advertising-intensive industries might be those with high entry barriers.
That hypothesis was never convincingly demonstrated, however, in large part because it
looked only to information about firms’ costs, oblivious to what we now know: that
entry barriers have roots in strategic interaction as well as in costs.[74] Another SCP
hypothesis, explored with equal fervor, attempted to connect firm or industry market
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power reliably with market concentration. That hypothesis too was not convincingly
demonstrated. Here a large part of the SCP approach’s difficulties derived from the use
of accounting profit as the indicator of poor industry performance resulting from the
exercise of market power.
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The SCP methods ultimately failed because the empirical methods used to
establish both hypotheses were subject to fatal identification critiques from Chicago
school economists, a school of industrial organization economics which flourished until
the mid-1970s. These economists explained that instead of measuring only market power
and barriers to entry, structure-conduct-performance methods also left open the
possibility of another interpretation. Under that alternative view, all industries have free
entry and perform competitively, but there is a wide range in the productive efficiency of
firms within capital-intensive, advertising-intensive, and R&D-intensive industries.[75]
Firms could have large market shares and be profitable because they had achieved low
costs or other efficiencies, rather than because they exploited market power. The
Chicago identification argument has carried the day, and structure-conduct-performance
empirical methods have largely been discarded in economics. In consequence, modern
studies relating price to market concentration, perhaps the only area in which descendants
of structure-conduct-performance empirical methods are pursued today, are generally
limited to the examination of related industries, rather than seeking broad generalizations
across the economy.[76]
The structure-conduct-performance project in industrial organization economics
proceeded in parallel with a related legal project. The legal project, characteristic of
antitrust’s post-World War II structural era, sought to develop and deploy broad legal
rules, to be applied in all industries, that would be framed around measures of market
concentration.7[77] The legal project was unsuccessful for two reasons. First, it
eventually became clear that the rules that were adopted served to deter much efficient,
pro-competitive conduct. Second, reliance only on structural measures to detect market
power also became clearly problematic. The Chicago school of antitrust analysis, an
intellectual movement which has dominated the antitrust field in the U.S. since the midto late-1970s and confusingly shares a name and some participants with the earlier
Chicago school of industrial organization economics, played a major role in raising
discomfort with structural era legal rules. These antitrust commentators created a number
of case studies of leading antitrust decisions that showed how the challenged conduct
could alternatively be interpreted as efficient and pro-competitive.[78]
The doctrines of antitrust’s structural era came under pressure from both this legal
critique and from the economic critique of the parallel structure-conduct-performance
project in empirical industrial organization economics. In consequence, after the mid1970s, many if not most antitrust rules were modified, and some were overruled.
Antitrust doctrine generally moved away from bright line rules and toward open-ended
reasonableness standards. For example, per se rules against vertical non-price restraints
and maximum resale price maintenance have been overruled, the per se prohibition
against horizontal price-fixing has been narrowed, and the structural presumption in
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merger analysis, once a near-per se prohibition against all but the smallest horizontal
mergers, has eroded.
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Some Chicago school antitrust commentators have sought to replace the discarded
structural era bright line rules with new ones, reflecting a new set of broad, economywide presumptions in favor of interpreting most conduct as reflecting efficiencies
achieved in competitive markets.[79] While these efforts have achieved some success,[80]
on the whole antitrust law examines much more firm conduct under a reasonableness
standard today than was true a generation ago.[81] We suspect that most economists think
that this leads to better antitrust policy formation (at least if the higher costs of running
the legal system to decide cases under reasonableness standards are ignored.)
Leading developments in the post-Chicago evolution of antitrust generally
continue to push doctrine away from bright line rules and toward an economic-based
reasonableness analysis. These include use of the “raising rivals’ costs” framework for
evaluating exclusionary conduct,[82] recognition of the possibility of unilateral
competitive effects of mergers among sellers of differentiated products,[83] establishment
of the possibility that predatory pricing could be a rational strategy,[84] attention to
understanding how a merger affects the incentives of the “maverick” seller when
evaluating coordinated competitive effects,[85] the use of direct evidence of market power
to trump evidence of low market shares in exclusion cases,[86] and the evaluation of the
potential loss of research and development competition in innovation markets.[87] The
main post-Chicago development going the other way, toward bright line rules, is the
application of truncated or structured legal rules to condemn the conduct of a monopolist
who excludes a rival without an adequate business justification, without need for direct
proof of harm to competition.[88]
In the adversarial context of competition policy implementation, the choice
between bright line rules and unstructured standards presents a decision-theoretic
tradeoff.[89] Bright line rules, including antitrust’s per se rules, promise to lower
transactions costs. They give guidance to firms seeking to comply with the law and to
generalist judges seeking to apply it. They do so by limiting what must be shown to
prove or disprove an offense – for example, by excluding certain arguments that a litigant
might wish to proffer and in consequence excluding evidence related to those arguments
– thereby also promising to reduce the transactions costs of litigation. But these
advantages come at the price of greater errors in classifying firm conduct, either false
convictions (finding violations when the conduct was pro-competitive) or false acquittals
(failing to find a violation when the conduct harmed competition). By contrast,
unstructured standards, including reasonableness tests, promise to make fewer errors by
allowing courts to review all relevant evidence and arguments. But they may achieve this
benefit at the price of reducing guidance to courts and firms, and raising transactions
costs of litigation.
The advantages of reasonableness analysis were particularly apparent in the wake
of economic criticisms of the bright line doctrinal rules that were characteristic of
antitrust’s structural era. The effort by some Chicago school antitrust commentators to
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convince courts instead to codify bright line doctrinal rules based on a new set of broad
presumptions, more accepting of a wide range of firm conduct, may have been stalled by
the inability of Chicago school economists to convince the economics profession that
new presumptions had deep empirical economic support. Chicago school antitrust
scholars listened to Chicago school economists explain that “structure-conductperformance methods cannot show market power,” but formulated policy
recommendations as though the lesson had been the overstatement “there is little or no
market power in the economy.”
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B.

Limited Generalizations Across Related Industries

Since the late 1970s, mainstream industrial organization economics have adopted
the industry case study methodology previously employed fruitfully by Chicago school
economists in the preceding era, but now with improved empirical methods. The “New
Empirical Industrial Organization” emphasized the creation of empirical tools that could
be adapted to analyze individual industries, for purposes that included the identification
and measurement of market power.[90] The large and varied literature that resulted has
identified market power in many industries, thereby undermining the possibility of an
empirical basis for broad bright line antitrust rules raising high bars to antitrust
challenges across the board.[91] At the same time, theoretical industrial organization
economists, deploying the game-theoretic tools through which microeconomics has been
reconstructed since the 1970s, have shown that a wide range of business conduct that
Chicago school economists view as consistent with the competitive model could be
understood as competitive under some conditions but as reflecting the exercise or
creation of market power under others. This theoretical development has also militated
against the project undertaken by Chicago school antitrust commentators of identifying
broad presumptions that could be codified in antitrust rules.
The application of reasonableness standards in antitrust decision-making and the
modern empirical literature in industrial organization economics have an important area
of commonality: both treat the industry as the appropriate unit of observation. Both
fields recognize that a one-size-fits-all approach to analyzing business conduct won’t do,
because so much variation in outcomes arises from factors specific to each individual
industry. Empirical investigation of game-theoretic models of competition in a variety of
industries shows that some of these factors are strategic. The most plausible competitive
or efficiency theory of any particular industry’s structure and business practices is as
likely to be idiosyncratic to that industry as the most plausible strategic theory with
market power. In addition, the probative value of various types of evidence as to market
power, entry, efficiencies and the like, including the relative availability and usefulness
of qualitative and quantitative evidence, often differs from one industry to the next.
This perspective does not mean that each industry must be analyzed afresh,
without reference to what is known about other industries. Both antitrust law and
industrial organization economics have come to recognize that related industries often are
sufficiently similar to provide useful guidance. Many of the same legal and economic
questions arise, for example, in understanding firm behavior in markets in which products
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are sold at retail, in markets for basic metals with cyclical demand, in markets for hightech products sold in aftermarkets, and in any number of similar categories. One key
challenge for both antitrust analysis and empirical industrial organization economics
going forward, not recognized in antitrust to the extent it is understood in economics, is
to exploit similarities among related industries to focus an inquiry involving the industry
and firms under study.
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For example, it is widely recognized that product differentiated industries as a
class present certain common behaviors and analytical problems, but few economists
would argue that any particular product differentiated industry could be analyzed for
market power, competitive effects, or demand substitution without industry-specific
analysis. What the research literature has done is identify a set of industries in which
broadly the same tool kit may be used to examine market power. Within them, an
enquiry which looks only at demand substitution to address market definition and identify
market power, ignoring supply-side factors like costs and strategic conduct, is in general
likely to be largely right.[92]
Another example of the value of information about related industries comes from
the large literature on pharmaceutical markets studying the entry of generic drugs in
competition with previously patent-protected brand name drugs.[93] This literature
establishes a presumption about the relevant product market in a merger between (say)
the brand name producer and the first generic entrant. In particular, if that merger were
to occur around the time that the drug’s goes off patent, the relevant product market for
the merger analysis is likely to be exactly this drug, not including other drugs in the same
therapeutic category, making the transaction a merger to monopoly. Similarly, the
literature establishes a presumption that the likely competitive effects of such a merger
would be to prevent price declines in the form of cheaper generics. These presumptions
could be overcome in the detailed review of facts surrounding a particular merger, of
course, but these generalizations from an academic literature that has looked at
differences in market outcomes in many pharmaceutical markets when drugs go off
patent should be treated as a legitimate and potentially persuasive basis for reaching
conclusions in any particular investigation.
A third example, taken from the Microsoft litigation, illustrates how a
presumption, reasonably derived from a generalization across related industries, can be
rebutted. In his testimony for Microsoft in that case, Dean Richard L Schmalensee relied
upon generalizations from the software industry as a whole to inform his views about
market power and entry in operating systems, the particular software category that
Microsoft was accused of monopolizing. Schmalensee testified that “[c]ompetition in the
software industry is based on sequential races for the leadership of categories such as
word processing, spreadsheets, personal financial software, games, operating systems and
utilities.” Although there may be some switching costs, “the history and reality of the
microcomputer industry” show that superior alternatives, for which consumers are
willing abandon their investment in the products of the category leader, “come
often.” Indeed, “[h]istory has shown that when faced with a superior alternative,
software users switch and do so in droves.” Accordingly, Schmalensee concluded,
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Microsoft’s success and high share in the operating-system category does not mean it has
monopoly power. “Rather, like other firms in this industry, it is in a constant struggle for
competitive survival,” including its struggle “to maintain its leadership in operating
systems.”[94]
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As these excerpts suggest, Dean Schmalensee recognized, correctly, that many
software markets can be characterized by leapfrog competition, in which the winner
obtains a high share for a time, only to be supplanted when a superior product comes
along. He applied this generalization about software markets to the particular software
category, operating systems, that was the subject of the monopolization litigation. In
short, Schmalensee did what we suggest: he used what he learned about related
industries to focus the inquiry about operating systems software. Based on how
competition often works in software markets generally, it was reasonable to approach this
case initially as Schmalensee did, by adopting a presumption that competition works
similarly in operating systems software. Indeed, the Government adopted a version of
the same presumption in its theory of competitive harm, which posited the possibility of
leapfrog competition in the operating system market if new Internet technologies, such as
Netscape’s browser or Sun’s Java, were to come into widespread use.
But along with the court, we think the presumption as used by Dean Schmalensee
was rebutted by the evidence presented by the Justice Department and state plaintiffs
demonstrating that operating systems in the period at issue were a monopoly.
Microsoft’s leading position in operating systems was buttressed by the so-called
“applications barrier to entry” that gives consumers reason to prefer the dominant
operating system, Microsoft’s Windows, even if they would prefer another operating
system if all or most applications programs available for Windows were rewritten for
that operating system. When Microsoft took steps to impede the success of a new
technology (Netscape’s Internet browser combined with Sun’s Java programming
langauge) that had the potential for reducing the applications barrier to entry, those acts
allowed Microsoft to maintain its operating systems monopoly.
Our point here is not to reargue the Microsoft case. It is to show how a
generalization taken from the experiences of related industries can create a presumption
about how competition works in the industry under study -- and to show that the
presumption can be rebutted with industry-specific evidence to explain why it does not
apply in the specific case under review.
IV.

Design of Institutions for Antitrust Decision-Making

Antitrust decision-making relies centrally upon economic reasoning and upon
economic evidence. The importance of economic reasoning in antitrust decision-making
puts a premium on ensuring that decision-makers are capable of that task.
The institutional structure of the U.S. courts and antitrust enforcement agencies
presents a mixed picture of the sophistication of economic thinking. The enforcement
agencies have a well-developed institutional capacity to obtain economic input from a
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professional staff of Ph.D economists, and antitrust lawyers in leadership roles often have
developed a substantial facility with economic reasoning from their long engagement
with the antitrust field.[95] Indeed, many attorneys in the antitrust bar show considerable
economic sophistication. But the courts do not have these advantages. Judges are
generalists. Most lack experience with antitrust or economics and do not generally have
the same training as professional economists.[96] Unlike agency officials, judges do not
have much access to economic support. Accordingly, there is a serious discrepancy
between tasks judges are called upon to do in antitrust cases – evaluating or even
undertaking economic reasoning – and the capabilities of many judges to perform that
task.
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Moreover, the litigation context in which much antitrust analysis occurs can
direct the attention of a court away from the most important issues in evaluating
economic evidence. The litigation setting encourages precision in the details, more so
than the academic setting, where a small computational mistake, for example, would be
unlikely to raise a question about the credibility of the researcher. Moreover, the
litigation context can undervalue the importance of the big picture – of linking the
economic evidence with a theory of the case, or measuring key economic relationships
and effects using sensible methods. These problems, which could be of great
significance in the academic setting, may be dismissed as merely another disagreement
among experts.
Recognition of the difficulties courts face in evaluating economic evidence in
antitrust cases is not new. Frank Easterbrook (1984) has termed the difficulties of
making correct judgments under a reasonableness standard in any individual case the
“limits of antitrust.” Easterbrook’s solution was to recommend that courts adopt simple
and general bright line doctrinal rules in the antitrust field, rather than endorsing a wideranging reasonableness analysis in individual cases. We do not object in principle to
bright line rules based on convincing economic generalizations from a substantial
program of careful empirical research. But absent progress in developing such rules, we
propose two other approaches to this problem that do not avoid the detailed analysis of
industry evidence.
Our first proposal is that empirical economists – both academics and
economists at the antitrust enforcement agencies – work to unify the tool kit used in
academic work and in antitrust work and begin to create a catalogue of generalizations
about various industry structures – a set of stylized facts and (rebuttable) presumptions
about groups of related industries. We have already provided two examples of the kind
of generalizations and presumptions we have in mind. One is a presumption about the
likely loss of competition from a merger involving the producer of a brand name drug
producer and the first generic entrant, which could be expressed in the form of a narrow
product market. Another is the generalization that shifts in retail prices in differentiated
consumer products industries resulting from horizontal merger will generally reflect the
effect of the merger on the pricing constraint imposed by demand substitution, not
supply-side changes in cost or the oligopoly solution concept. These kinds of
generalizations would be used to structure the analysis in individual antitrust cases and
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suggest the kind of evidence that would be most appropriate. The antitrust agencies
could assume the job of organizing conferences of empirical economists to identify the
consensus view of the economics profession, and write reports to codify the resulting
generalizations and presumptions, and making them available to help judges and
litigants.[97]
Our second proposal involves helping judges interpret economic evidence and
assess its probative value.[98] Various methods of doing so have been tried, including the
use of court-appointed economic experts,[99] the use of judicial law clerks with economic
expertise,[100] and direct questioning of one economic expert by another. The legal debate
over options for giving courts greater access to economic expertise has mainly addressed
the pros and cons of court-appointed experts. The commentary highlights the importance
of finding an independent expert acceptable to the parties (particularly in fields where
basic principles are in dispute), making any independent expert’s views transparent to the
litigants, and giving the parties an opportunity to comment on those views. One concern
is that otherwise a district court judge, having selected an independent expert, may in
practice give that expert’s views too much deference. Another is the difficulty finding a
neutral independent expert, free from conflicts and strong ideological presumptions, who
could be available at the court’s convenience. Many of the best potential experts – well
versed in aspects of economics most relevant to antitrust and sufficiently experienced
with antitrust litigation to understand how to assist a court – have a high opportunity cost
of taking on new projects and may not find it attractive to work for the court, perhaps
excluding high-profile cases, unless they are able to limit the time they must commit. A
third concern is that utilization of a court-appointed independent expert may add to the
length and cost of litigation.
We suspect that the most pressing need for improvement in the design of
institutions for antitrust decision-making is to find a way to clarify for generalist judges
the nature of the dispute between economic experts for opposing parties. This
observation suggests that a court-appointed economic expert would confer substantial
value by undertaking a limited task: reviewing the reports of opposing experts, and
writing his or her own report for the court that supplements the work of party experts by
explaining where those experts disagree and why (without necessarily taking a view of
his or her own on the resolution of key disputes). Party experts could be allowed to
comment on the independent expert’s report, but oral testimony and cross-examination of
the independent expert would not be necessary.
This proposal for what might be termed a “clarifying expert” would have a
number of advantages. It would give the judge help in understanding the economic
arguments in the case. The limited scope for the court-appointed expert would encourage
the judge to view the expert as providing help, rather than as an authority to be deferred
to.[101] The limited assignment would also encourage a strong and deep pool of potential
independent experts to make themselves available for consideration for the clarifying
expert role. If the clarifying expert’s report is made public (presumably after redacting
confidential business information), that would encourage high quality analysis by the
clarifying expert, by allowing for peer review of his or her output, and encourage high

30

quality analysis by the party experts, by creating a public record of an independent view
of their economic work.[102]
A number of important details would still have to be worked out to implement
this suggestion – such as how the independent clarifying expert is selected (must the
parties agree? can they wield a veto?), what materials the expert may review (just the
expert reports?), how much direction the court will provide (perhaps by indicating where
the judge would most benefit from clarification), at what stage in the proceeding should a
clarifying expert be involved,[103] and the like. We have sketched our proposal to
encourage further deliberation about the way institutional design affects the ability of
judges to undertake sound economic reasoning in antitrust litigation.[104]
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Attention to the capacity of courts to apply economic reasoning is important
because of the central role that judges play in shaping and implementing U.S. antitrust
policy. The success of the antitrust enforcement agencies owes much to the way
decision-makers in those institutions are able to interact with economists.[105] Courts
have done so too, but only indirectly, through what judges learn from the experts in their
courtroom, economic articles cited by the litigants, and the economic reasoning
embedded in the doctrinal rules that they employ. Our proposals seek to bring judges
even closer to how economists think and what economists know.
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[1]
E.g. Hospital Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (upholding
F.T.C. determination that a hospital merger would likely harm competition by facilitating coordination was
upheld based on a detailed review of post-merger market structure, integrating a wide range of factors
beyond market concentration); Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D. D.C.
1997) (enjoining a merger between office superstore chains based on evidence that head-to-head
competition between the merging firms led to lower prices, regardless of the presence of warehouse club
stores, mass merchandisers, or independent retail office supply stores in the area); United States v. Waste
Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (overturning lower court injunction barring a merger
between two Dallas-area waste disposal firms resulting in high market concentration, because easy entry
into the market made the exercise of market power unlikely).
[2]
E.g. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding lower court finding of
liability against Microsoft based upon detailed economic analysis of the way the exclusion of Microsoft’s
browser rival from access to the most important channels of distribution protected Microsoft’s operating
system monopoly from a significant long-term competitive threat, thus allowing it to maintain its market
power); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.2d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (relying on economic
analysis of factors including market structure affecting the ability of firms to coordinate successfully to
uphold award of summary judgment to defendants in a horizontal price-fixing case); National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (concluding that the association regulating
college sports had effectively created a cartel by selling television rights for all college football games, and
preventing schools or conferences from contracting with television networks on their own).
[3]
Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), overruling United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
[4]
The empirical revolution in antitrust analysis was arguably ushered in by our development of empirical
methods of estimating residual demand elasticities during the mid-1980s. Baker and Bresnahan (1985,
1988).
[5]
Baker and Bresnahan (1992). For a more recent survey, see Baker and Rubinfeld (1999).
[6]
Carlton and Perloff (2005).
[7]
Non-economic goals played a greater role in the U.S. prior to the late 1970s than they do today, but even
then economic goals were important.
[8]
See generally, Lopatka and Page (2005).
[9]
The antitrust injury requirement was introduced in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477 (1977) in a setting in which a rival sought damages from a merger alleged to harm competition
by facilitating horizontal coordination. Later decisions have extended the requirement substantially. Gavil,
Kovacic and Baker (2002, pp. 777-88). For example, in Microsoft, the appeals court interpreted Brunswick
as requiring proof that the monopolist’s conduct harmed competition not just competitors. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 243 F.3d 34, 589-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In that case, the antitrust injury requirement was
applied to an allegation of exclusionary (not collusive) conduct challenged under the Sherman Act (not the
Clayton Act) by a government plaintiff (not a private plaintiff) seeking injunctive relief (not damages) – a
setting far indeed from that of Brunswick.
[10]
Here we view economic methods broadly, as going beyond theoretical modeling and econometric data
analysis to include experimental and simulation methods.
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[11]

Rigorous analysis is important regardless of whether the economic theory of the case is presented
informally or through a formal model. In some sense, a model is always lurking in the background when
an economist, attorney or judge interprets evidence. (We use the term “model” broadly to include all
abstract frameworks. In appropriate circumstances, a table or a verbal articulation of an economic story
would both count as models.)
[12]
Specification includes a full description of the economic model and an account of the nature of
stochastic components (errors). See Reiss and Wolak (2005, §§ 4.1, 4.2).
[13]
Manski (1995). Manksi defines “identification” as the range of conclusions that could be drawn if one
could use the sampling process to obtain an unlimited number of observations (as distinct from the
additional “statistical” problems in making inferences arising from the fact that samples are finite). His
definition includes the use we make of the term identification, i.e., whether a model which distinguishes
between policy-relevant conclusions and alternative explanations of the same phenomena can be estimated.
[14]
To be sure, the Merger Guidelines suggest an algorithm for inferring unilateral effects from market
shares, but this algorithm is rarely if ever employed, as it depends upon the generally unrealistic
assumption that each product’s market share reflects not only its relative appeal as a first choice to buyers
but also its relative appeal as a second choice, and hence as a competitive constraint.
[15]
Baker (2003a) explores why the antitrust enforcement agencies adopted unilateral effects theories in
merger analysis.
[16]
On the limited probative value of market shares in assessing likely unilateral effects, see Baker (1997b).
[17]
However, some remain skeptical of the possibility of unilateral effects when market shares are low.
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
[18]
The enquiry in a monopolization case would be different, typically asking whether there is market
power in the industry already, which might be sustained by an anticompetitive act or practice. Market
definition offers an imperfect way to get at this question too. For a discussion of market definition in cases
in which the alleged harm is retrospective and the alleged anticompetitive conduct is exclusionary, see
Baker (2006).
[19]
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992,
revised 1997) (available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/doc/horizmer.htm >).
[20]
Market definition is exclusively concerned with the economic force of demand substitution under the
methodology of the merger guidelines. In non-merger contexts, some U.S. courts also incorporate
considerations of supply substitution in the market definition step, rather than later in antitrust analysis.
The use of supply substitution to define markets is criticized in Baker (2006).
[21]
The firm’s residual demand function is the demand curve that results after accounting for the best
response of non-merging rivals.
[22]
This condition follows from the first order condition for profit-maximization, assuming differences in
price and price-cost margin among sellers within the group can be ignored. For a general discussion of
related issues, see Werden (1998).
[23]
As will be discussed, calculations of the Lerner Index must deal with a range of issues including
aggregation problems (as arise from heterogeneity in prices and costs among the market participants) and
the difficulties associated with inferring a sensible economic measure of marginal cost from accounting
data.
[24]
If the errors are correlated with other independent variables, the bias could go in either direction.
[25]
Empirical studies of retailer behavior find that products generally decline in price during predictable
periods of peak demand (such as seasons for some products or certain holidays for others). (Hosken and
Reiffen (2004a, 2004b); Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003); MacDonald (2000); Warner and Barsky
(1995).) The literature interprets this observation as typically resulting from a reduction in the retailer’s
per-customer distribution costs (which decline as the density of customers grows). (Alternative
explanations – that demand tends to grow more elastic at predictable peaks, or that manufacturers choose to
compete more aggressively – appear inconsistent with evidence that promotion levels typically surge and
manufacturer margins generally do not decline.) In consequence, the model may need to account for the
possibility that marginal cost as well as demand varies seasonally or that both marginal cost and demand
could be related to the level of promotional activity. Alternatively, a model in which interactions between
buyers and sellers are explicitly dynamic (that is, one in which price is not determined in the one period
run) might be employed.
[26]
Hendel and Nevo (2002).
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[27]

For detailed discussions of the identification issues, see Reiss and Wolak (2005, §7.1); Bresnahan
(1998).
[28]
This type of argument was successful in New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.
N.Y. 1995). A similar argument was advanced by defendants in responding to the F.T.C.’s challenge to the
merger of two baby food producers, Beech-Nut and Heinz. Baker (2004).
[29]
For surveys, see Werden and Froeb (2005), in this volume, and Epstein and Rubinfeld (2004). It is
worth noting that the quantitative analysis underlying a merger simulation is closely related to the
quantitative analysis underlying a market definition or market power assessment. In the merger setting, key
inputs include estimates of the substitution possibilities between the products of the merging firms and
among the products of the merging firms and other sellers and estimates of the competitive response to a
merger by other firms. The simulation methodology takes those inputs and puts them in a helpful and
policy-relevant form, facilitating interpretation and the evaluation of the practical economic significance of
alternative assumptions, but it cannot substitute for weaknesses in the estimates. In the market definition
setting, a simple simulation methodology called “critical loss analysis,” based on estimate of the magnitude
of demand substitution, is sometimes employed. In practice, however, the approach commonly embodies a
number of simplifying assumptions that do not invariably hold, and can in consequence lead to misleading
results. For a discussion, see Baker (2006).
[30]
See generally Ashenfelter, Ashmore, Baker, Gleason & Hosken (2006); Baker (1999).
[31]
The empirical study of natural experiments involving changes in market structure can also provide an
indication of the likely price effects from the loss of localized competition, by facilitating a comparison
between prices with and without the presence of that localized competition. This is an alternative
interpretation of the econometric study relied upon by the F.T.C. in Staples. A similar study was
introduced by defendants in the baby food merger case. Baker (2004).
[32]
E.g. Bresnahan (1987), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Goldberg (1995), Nevo (2000), Petrin
(2002), and Trajtenberg (1990).
[33]
E.g. Borenstein and Rose (1994), Leslie (2004), Shephard (1991).
[34]
E.g. Athey and Levin (2001); Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000);
Hedricks and Porter (1988). Identification for auction models is discussed in Athey and Haile (2001).
[35]
The types of evidence available for assessing demand substitution in market definition are surveyed in
Baker (2006).
[36]
We describe an anecdote of this sort taken from our consulting experience in Baker and Bresnahan
(1992, p.6).
[37]
Berry & Pakes (1993); Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995); Bresnahan, Stern & Trajtenberg (1997);
Nevo (2000, 2001).
[38]
See the discussion of conjoint survey methods in Baker & Rubinfeld (1999).
[39]
Notification M/04/032, Proposed Acquisition of IBM Ireland Limited Of Schlumberger Business
Continuity Services (Ireland) Limited, Irish Competition Authority (Oct. 28, 2004) (available at
http://www.tca.ie/).
[40]
Whether the most convincing evidence about economic concepts like market power or efficiencies is
systematic empirical evidence derived from econometric analysis or more qualitative, as with much
evidence derived from documents and testimony, such evidence is necessarily predicated on a set of
assumptions that permit inference. As we noted previously when describing information as local, empirical
analysis cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Even when systematic empirical methods are employed,
documents and testimony invariably and appropriately play a role in specifying a model and interpreting its
results.
[41]
Another example of such a data set, from outside the litigation context, comes from Bresnahan and
Ramey (1994) which uses information on managers’ reported motives for temporary automobile plant
closings and shift changes in the automobile industry. The economic literature on the study of sales and on
couponing (e.g., Nevo and Wolfram (2002)) has made progress on understanding these phenomena without
managerial information.
[42]
If the views of industry experts (including, for example, the views of sellers of complementary
products) are used to judge the likely buyer substitution responses to prices, their reliability as evidence
would be assessed similarly to what is inferred from seller conduct: based on whether the experts are in a
position to gather direct information about buyers, and whether they base costly business decisions on that
information.
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[43]

Of course, the absence of supply shifters would equally prevent identification of the demand elasticity
using quantitative methods.
[44]
The defense might also raise problems with the government’s inference other than identification. For
example, if a defense showing that the firms monitor other rivals nearly as much as they monitor each other
can be thought of as a qualitative analogue to problems with estimation in data analysis.
[45]
Some commentators view monopoly power as another term for market power; others view it as market
power of more than some threshold magnitude. Either way, proof of monopoly power requires proof of
market power.
[46]
Many of these methodologies are surveyed in Reiss and Wolak (2005); Porter (2005); Bresnahan
(1989); and, less technically, in Baker and Bresnahan (1992).
[47]
If a firm (or group of firms) with market power (collectively) exclude a rival with no legitimate
(procompetitive) justification, antitrust law will not require proof that price has increased. The best
economic interpretation comes from a decision-theoretic framework: false acquittals are unlikely (because
the firms involved could exercise or be exercising market power) and false convictions are unlikely
(because there is no procompetitive reason for the conduct).
[48]
Thus, with n products, equation (1) is from Rn to Rn.
[49]
In many studies of product differentiated industries, however, equation (2) is not estimated. Alternative
methods that might be employed in studying such industries are discussed below under the headings
“Estimating Demand” and “Direct Measurement.”
[50]
Much of the literature focuses on differentiated products, but a substantial new literature looks at the
implications for market power of increasing firm marginal costs. The electricity industry has proven fertile
ground for such studies, because good observable indicators of cost-related variables like (the other) firms’
capacity and variety in the efficiency of plants are often available. E.g. Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak
(2002); Borenstein and Bushnell (1999); Wolfram (1999).
[51]
In the context of a homogeneous goods industry, this is the slope of the industry demand curve times
industry quantity. In a product-differentiated industry, it depends on the slopes of individual products and
on which products are provided by a particular firm. See Bresnahan (1982) for details.
[52]
Baker and Bresnahan (1985, 1988).
[53]
See, for example, Wolfram's (1999) study of duopoly pricing in electricity, which turns on a careful
analysis of where both firms are located on their short run marginal cost function, rising because their
plants vary in efficiency. See also Wolak (2003) for discussion of the California energy crisis emphasizing
unilateral market power that arose because of capacity constraints. As weather shocks constrained the
capacity of hydroelectric producers, fossil-fuel producers faced less elastic residual demand curves.
[54]
Moreover, coordinating firms that find it difficult to reach consensus and deter deviation may adopt
inflexible pricing rules. If so, simple methods of inferring L, based on observing price responses to
changes in the elasticity of demand or observable components of cost (discussed below) may not be able to
distinguish coordination from competition.
[55]
For example, a test for monopoly could be based on the prediction that a monopolist that sells a single
product and does not discriminate in price would set its price such that L= 1/,, or equivalently, such that L,
= 1. See Genesove and Mullin (1999) for an implementation of this test.
[56]
The Lerner Index estimate is presumably derived as an average of the price-cost margins in a number
of transactions, over which price and cost vary because of shifts in the exogenous variables Y, W, and Z
and the stochastic terms u and v. In general, the precision of the inference about firm conduct will depend
on the variation in L from transaction to transaction, and on whether this variation can be linked
empirically to variation in the important determinants of firm conduct across those transactions. Moreover,
the Lerner Index for an industry is not well-defined unless price plays an allocative role in transactions, so
this method of inference is difficult to employ in the presence of certain forms of price discrimination such
as volume discounts, loyalty discounts across multiple products sold by a single firm, and the like.
[57]
Special problems in relating a measure of the Lerner Index to market power arise in industries with
high fixed costs and low (and non increasing) marginal costs. These might include computer software,
airline transportation, or some entertainment industries, for example. In such industries, some or all buyers
will likely be charged a price in excess of marginal cost. This may occur even when there is free entry, if
the fixed costs are so high that an increase in competition would lead a new entrant to be unprofitable. One
problem that arises under such circumstances is that it is theoretically possible that the threat of entry
constrains existing firms. More precisely, the average prices of incumbent firms might be constrained not to
exceed entrant average cost. In that case, the competitive price would need to be defined relative to the
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incremental cost associated with an entrant, a variant of marginal cost. This problem is unlikely to be
important in practice, however, as the presence of such a powerful constraint by potential entrants has not
been identified in any market studied in the empirical economics literature and appears to call for extreme
assumptions theoretically.
Another problem that arises under such circumstances is that the exercise of market power can
theoretically be efficient. If the fixed costs of entry are large relative to the size of the market, adding
competitors may reduce welfare, even though price is above marginal cost. This result suggests a possible
efficiency justification for an acquisition in an industry with high fixed and low marginal costs. Such a
justification should be considered only with great caution, for demonstrating empirically that a less
competitive market structure is more efficient is very difficult. Such a justification should almost never be
considered in technologically progressive industries, for example, for the efficiency conclusion could only
follow if there were no benefits of innovation rivalry among active firms.
[58]
These difficulties with measuring the appropriate economic concept of marginal cost also create
problems when accounting information on marginal cost is used as an input into the simulation of price
increases. This may occur in antitrust litigation in the analysis of competitive effects of firm conduct or in
market definition, where “critical loss” simulations are sometimes employed.
[59]
Bresnahan (1982); Lau (1982). For example, Reiss and Wolak (2005) show that if equation (1) is
specified as P = α0 + α1 Y + β Q1/γ + u, and marginal cost is specified as C = c0 + c1 W + v, a function that
does not depend on output, then the quasi-supply function (2) simplifies to the reduced form P =
[1/(γ+θ)][(α0 θ + γc0 ) + α1 θY+ γ c1W + (θ u + γ v)]. If the demand curve parameters α1 and γ have been
estimated, then θ, an estimator of L,, can be inferred from the coefficient on Y in this equation, so θ is
identified.
The key to econometric identification of θ in this example is the presence of a variable Y,
which allows the demand function to rotate in observable ways.
[60]
Economists recognize that price discrimination can occur in markets where entry competes the long run
profit rate to zero for marginal entrants. Restaurants in a large city, which often discount entrees for “early
bird” customers, might present an example. (The example assumes that such discounts are greater than
might be explained by any reduction in marginal cost, which in this case might reflect the lower probability
of reaching a capacity constraint during off-peak periods.) Baker (2003b) describes this limiting case as an
example of the exercise of market power without the possibility of anticompetitive effect. (Product
differentiation could similarly compete profits to zero, as in the model of monopolistic competition, but it
more commonly allows firms to create niches for their products that rivals could not profitably enter,
allowing the firm to earn economic profits. The limiting case of monopolistic competition again represents
the exercise of market power without anticompetitive effect.)
[61]
This is evident from the example in footnote 58. Without the presence of a variable Y that rotates
demand, it would be impossible to infer θ, the estimator of L,. The parameter cannot be backed out of the
intercept term [1/(γ+θ)][(α0 θ + γ c0 )] because that term depends both on θ and on c0 , the average level of
marginal cost.
[62]
American Tobacco Co. V. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
[63]
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft., J.).
[64]
See Baker (1999).
[65]
Carlton and Perloff (2005, pp. 128-30).
[66]
Bajari and Summers (2002); Porter and Zona (1993); Porter and Zona (1999).
[67]
Baker (2002b). When coordinated effects of merger are alleged, it is important to understand more than
merely whether the industry structure is conducive to coordination – whether firms can plausibly reach
consensus as to the terms of coordination, deter deviation (cheating) on those terms, and prevent new
competition (entry) – but also to understand the mechanism by which coordinated competitive effects of
mergers might arise. The latter question may be addressed by identifying a maverick firm which constrains
coordination from becoming more effective, and evaluating how the merger affect the pricing incentives of
that firm.
[68]
Baker (2002b) terms this the revealed preference strategy (when based on prices) or the natural
experiment strategy (when based on costs) for identifying a maverick. An example in which the revealed
preference strategy was applied based on qualitative evidence appears in Bresnahan (2002). Another
approach, termed by Baker the a priori factors strategy, identifies a maverick firm from structural
characteristics tending to suggest that it has more incentive than its rivals to keep coordination from
becoming fully effective or complete. For example, if excess capacity creates price pressure in the view of
industry participants, a merger of firms intending to reduce capacity could be understood as a transaction
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likely to alter the incentives facing firms likely to spoil attempts at more effective coordination. See F.T.C.
v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63-64 (D.D.C. 1998).
[69]
Similarly, using data from the steel industry during the Great Depression, Baker (1989) shows that
unexpected declines in demand (inferred from an estimated demand function) reduced price more than
would be explained merely by the effects of a demand decline on price holding conduct constant, and
concludes that the negative demand shocks led firms to act more competitively for a time. The firms
switched from a high price to a low price regime, at the same time as unexpected negative demand shocks,
suggesting a causal connection.
[70]
See Porter (2005) for a more nuanced and complete discussion of this topic. This methodology could
alternatively be thought of as a way of comparing observed conduct with that of competitive firms, which
would not be expected to experience occasional large reductions in price unrelated to shifts in cost or
demand.
[71]
See Bresnahan (1989) and Reiss and Wolak (2005) for reviews of some of this literature.
[72]
See, for example, Bresnahan (1987) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) on variation in market
power within the US automobile industry.
[73]
See Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) or Sutton (1991).
[74]
The strategic approach to understanding entry conditions transcended an older debate between
pioneering industrial organization economists Joe S. Bain and George Stigler. Bain emphasized the role of
structural factors in creating entry barriers, including absolute cost advantages of incumbents, product
differentiation and economies of scale. Stigler’s definition of entry barriers was limited to costs that must
be borne by an entrant though not an incumbent. Stigler also questioned whether high capital requirements
could prevent entry given the wide range of financing opportunities from well-funded participants in
financial and credit markets. Modern industrial organization economists see Stigler’s framework as
including disadvantages to entrants which arise from the strategic forces determining industry structure.
Many of these are closely linked to costs, as strategic entry problems may arise particularly when the fixed
costs of entry are sunk and may be exacerbated by information asymmetries in financial and credit
markets. For example, Sutton (1991) shows that the presence of sunk costs, including irreversible
expenditures on research and development, capital and advertising, is a precondition for one form of
strategic entry barriers.
[75]
Accordingly, this effort could be thought of as more than a critique of the structure-conductperformance approach. It could be viewed instead as a second effort to establish a broad presumption, this
time that few industries exercise market power and possess entry barriers.
[76]
See, for example, the chapters in Weiss (1989).
[77]
For a brief survey of the three major eras in U.S. antitrust enforcement, classical, structural and
Chicago school, see Baker (2002a).
[78]
As a strategy for learning about antitrust enforcement generally, this approach has significant
limitations. The primary benefits of enforcement may come from deterring anticompetitive conduct among
non-defendants rather than from identifying and remedying specific problems in the markets in which
enforcement occurred, and in which the benefits of enforcement (or lack thereof) might be observed. Also,
we should expect antitrust enforcers to be selective if markets vary. Deterrence and selection make
identification difficult. Suppose, for example, we were to find that past mergers had no effect on
competition. That could either mean that competition policy authorities are doing a good job screening out
anticompetitive mergers, or that their policies are far too stringent in some dimension. To resolve the
question, we would like to know what would happen if a different set of mergers had been permitted. but
cannot perform that experiment. In Baker (2003a), this identification problem is addressed using
qualitative evidence by examining the behavior of U.S. firms during four periods or situations without
effective antitrust enforcement, and by examining the behavior of firms across national antitrust regimes
with different degrees of effectiveness.
[79]
Easterbrook (1984); Posner (1981).
[80]
For example, the legal rules concerning predatory pricing have been modified during the past few
decades to create nearly insurmountable hurdles for plaintiffs. New procedural rules involving antitrust
injury have combined with rules involving summary judgment standards in conspiracy cases to make it
difficult for a dealer to challenge its termination by a manufacturer as resulting from a vertical agreement
between the manufacturer and rival dealers as to price. Also, the legal rules concerning vertical non-price
agreements, which formally require a reasonableness analysis, have been applied in practice to make
successful challenges extremely rare.
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[81]

On the other hand, the recent development of structured inquiries like quick look rules for Sherman Act
analysis can be understood as moving some antitrust doctrine in the direction of bright line rules. The
current dispute as to whether “profit sacrifice” is a good guide to monopolization can also be understood as
an effort by the federal enforcement agencies to encourage adoption of a bright line rule. For criticism, see
Gavil (2005), Salop (2005).
[82]
Krattenmaker and Salop (1986).
[83]
E.g. Baker and Bresnahan (1985).
[84]
Brodley, Bolton and Riordan (2000).
[85]
Baker (2002b).
[86]
E.g. Toys ‘R’ Us v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
[87]
Gilbert and Sunshine (1995).
[88]
E.g. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In this case, the government
alleged that a number of Microsoft’s actions maintained high entry barriers into its operating system
monopoly. The court’s standard was truncated in the sense that it did not require the government to show
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